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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic and financial theories have widely used the assumption
that agents behave rationally. Such an assumption has failed to explain
some properties observed in financial markets such as (i) the excessive
volume traded [see Odean (1998b)], (i i) underreaction or overreaction
of market participants [see Debondt and Thaler (1985)], and (i i i) the
excessive volatility observed in financial markets [see Shiller (1981,
1989)]. In order to explain these properties, financial economists have
assumed that investors have psychological traits that lead them to
behave irrationally. However, the possibility of behavioral biases for
market makers has been mostly ignored. Subrahmanyam (2007) sug-
gests in the conclusion of his paper that this research avenue needs to
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be developed. Recent evidences in the literature show that market
makers, despite being experienced experts, are also subject to psycho-
logical biases. Corwin and Coughenour (2008) show that market
makers suffer from limited attention leading to an increase in transac-
tion cost for less active stocks in their portfolio as they focus on the
more actives ones. Oberlechner and Osler (2012) find that currency
dealers are overconfident on average as they underestimate uncertainty
and overestimate their own abilities. Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) find
evidences of participants mood influencing the stock market. However,
they find that it is not due to individual investors trading patterns. This
leaves the possibility of the market makers’ moods affecting it.1
In this paper we define a theoretical framework where rational and
irrational investors trade a risky asset with irrational market makers.
Introducing irrational market makers contrasts with the existing litera-
ture and allows us in particular to have a better understanding of how
financial markets perform. The novelty of this article is twofold. First
we consider the possibility for market makers to be irrational, and
second we study the interactions between irrational traders and irratio-
nal market makers.
Different forms of irrationality have been documented. However,
some are more prevalent than others. Among those are overconfidence
and optimism. Generally speaking overconfidence can be defined as
the tendency of the subjective confidence in judgments to be greater
than the objective accuracy. This has led people to overestimate their
knowledge (miscalibration) and exaggerate their ability to control
events (illusion of control). Overconfidence also takes the form of the
better than average effect and finally unrealistic optimism where peo-
ple believe that they are less likely to experience a negative event than
others. According to Fabre and François-Heude (2009) optimism is the
tendency to perceive a situation as more likely to result in a favorable
outcome, irrespective of the objective probability of that outcome
actually occurring.
We define an irrational investor as a trader suffering from overesti-
mation/ underestimation of his knowledge (miscalibration) and opti-
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1. Papers, such as Tetlock (2011) Baker and Stein (2004) and Linnainmaa (2007)
to name but a few, have shown that liquidity providers using limit orders are not always
rational and therefore do not always obtain zero expected profits.
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mism/pessimism. This is then translated into a trader having erroneous
beliefs about (i) the mean of prior information (returns of the risky
asset) and, (i i) the variance of the noise in their private information.
The former refers to the optimistic/pessimistic bias and the latter refers
to the underconfident/overconfident bias.2 Equivalently, an irrational
market maker has erroneous beliefs about the mean (optimistic bias)
and the variance of prior information (underconfidence/overconfi-
dence bias). We believe that modelling the optimistic bias as having
only an effect on the mean reflects the definition given by Fabre and
François-Heude (2009).3 Using this theoretical framework, we develop
a model of financial markets where irrational traders along with ratio-
nal traders trade a risky asset with a market maker. This new setting
combining rational and irrational traders with irrational market makers
allows us to derive interesting new features.
The market maker’s irrationality has different impact on the market.
We show that the variance misperception has an effect on price through
its effect on the level of liquidity. A variance optimistic or overconfi-
dent market maker believes that prior information is more precise than
it is and therefore believes that private information is less substantial
than it actually is. As a consequence, she adjusts her price less aggres-
sively and increases market depth. As market depth increases, the
orders submitted by traders have less impact on the price and informed
traders whether rational or irrational respond by trading more inten-
sely. The exact opposite effects take place for a variance pessimistic or
underconfident market maker. We now turn to the effect of the mean
misperception. An optimistic (pessimistic) market maker increases
(decreases) the overall level of price as she wrongly believes that the
expectation of the risky asset is higher (lower) than it actually is.
Again, whether rational or irrational, traders adjust the quantity they
trade to the increased or decreased price. Given those basic forces the
following results are obtained.
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2. It is only recently that researchers have shown that overconfidence and optimism
are empirically distinguishable [See Régner et al. (2004) and Glaser et al. (2010)].
Hilton (2007) shows the simultaneous presence of these two biases and their impact on
decision making.
3. Modelling in such a way the optimistic bias follows their model.
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• First of all, we show that, in contrast to most of the literature in
Finance [see Odean (1998b) or Kyle and Wang (1997)], irrational
market makers can obtain non-zero expected profit even if beha-
ving competitively. This is clearly the case when the market
maker is variance pessimistic but does not misperceive the mean
of prior information (when the market maker misperceives the
mean, the results are not as clear cut). In that case the market
depth is decreased which increases the price. As the price is
increased, informed traders reduce the quantity they trade.
However, as the liquidity trading is inelastic the market markers’
expected profits are positive. The opposite is true for a variance
optimistic market maker with correct beliefs of the mean of prior
information.
• Second, in accordance with some of the previous literature [see
Benos (1998), Odean (1998b) and Kyle and Wang (1997)] we
show that the presence of irrational traders may lead to the non-
existence of an equilibrium. This happens when traders would like
to trade an infinite quantity and market makers would like to sup-
ply infinite liquidity. Furthermore, we find that a variance opti-
mistic market maker exacerbates the nonexistence of equilibrium
whereas a variance pessimistic market maker alleviates it. A
variance optimistic market maker worsens the excessive trading
whereas a variance pessimistic has the opposite effect.
• Third, under the presence of irrational market makers, we find that
an underconfident trader can outperform a rational trader. This
striking new result contradicts Wang (2001) and was not put for-
ward in the literature so far. It relies on two important points: (i)
the market maker’s irrationality and (i i) the disagreement about
the mean of prior information between the underconfident trader
and the irrational market maker. Indeed, contrary beliefs, if suffi-
ciently different, lead the underconfident trader to buy (or sell)
when prices are too low (or too high) on average. The first point,
(i) , is documented in recent papers: Oberlechner and Osler
(2012), Glaser and Weber. (2007), Hilton (2001), and Glaser et al.
(2007). The second point, (i i) , is illustrated by Krichene (2004),
whose analysis recovers the euro-dollar rate from option prices for
June 2004 as expected by market participants on May 5, 2004. He
finds that the market was constituted with two distinct groups of
110 L. Germain, F. Rousseau, A. Vanhems
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traders. One was expecting an appreciation of the dollar with
respect to the euro and one was anticipating a depreciation of the
dollar against the euro. Such a situation with the presence of two
groups having distinct beliefs can occur during a transition period
for the market when some market participants change their beliefs
regarding the asset while others keep their beliefs.
• Fourth, our model predicts high level of traded volume for ext-
reme level of confidence including the case where traders are
underconfident. In the previous literature this excessive volume
traded has been explained by the presence of overconfident tra-
ders [see Odean (1998b)]. In our setting, we show that the volume
traded might not be a monotonic function of the traders’ level of
confidence. Indeed it can display a U-shape form as a function of
the level of overconfidence. Our model also predicts high level of
volatility. We find that the traders’ responsiveness to private infor-
mation is greatly affected by the market makers’ confidence. For
the case where irrational traders are underconfident, an undercon-
fident market maker leads to too much trading from rational tra-
ders. It is their large trading on private information that leads to
the non-existence of the equilibrium. 
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section reviews related
work. Then, the general model is presented along with the definition of
an equilibrium for our model. In section IV, we derive the equilibrium
for the general case and we also analyze two benchmark cases i.e. the
case where no market participants are irrational and the case where
only a subset of traders are irrational. In section V, we provide compa-
rative statics concerning the expected volume and stress the impact of
irrationality on financial markets for the general case. Finally, in sec-
tion VI we summarize our results and conclude. All proofs are gathe-
red in the appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a large body of evidence in the psychology literature sug-
gesting that people do not always have an accurate perception of them-
selves and their surrounding world. Such misperceptions impact peo-
Irrational Market Makers 111
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ple’s decision making. Evidences suggest that people may display
overconfidence such as miscalibration, positive illusions, better than
average effect and illusion of control.4 Miscalibration is defined as the
tendency for people to overestimate the precision of their knowledge.
Ito (1990) demonstrates the existence of miscalibration in the foreign
exchange market. Further evidence is provided by Odean (1998a,
1998b, 1999) and Hilton (2001). Positive illusions has been documen-
ted in Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) and Weinstein (1980). Taylor
and Brown (1988, 1994) analyze the “better than average” effect whe-
reas Weinstein (1980) looks at unrealistic optimism. Financial practi-
tioners are also well aware of the existence of such psychological traits
for investors trading in financial markets. For example, the Union des
Banques Suisses together with Gallup Organization have launched in
October 1996 the Index of Investor Optimism.5
Although underconfidence has received less attention than over-
confidence, recent evidence has cast doubt on the generality of over-
confidence. People tend to be overconfident on easy tasks where abso-
lute performance is high and tend to be underconfident on difficult
tasks where absolute performance is low (Hoelzl and Rustichini
(2005), and Moore and Cain (2007) among others). It has also been
found that underconfidence in judgements of learning can increase
with practice. This phenomenon is named Underconfidence With
Practice (UWP) [See Koriat et al. (2002) and Serra and Dunlosky
(2005) for instance]. In an experimental setting, Glaser et al. (2007)
compare the trend recognition and forecasting ability of novices and
financial participants. A third of the financial participants report wor-
king for the market making industry. Two types of trend recognition
are analyzed: probability estimates and confidence intervals.
Underconfidence occurs for probability estimates for both groups,
though to a lesser extent for financial professionals.
Most of the literature in Finance predicts that overconfident inves-
tors trade to their disadvantage and fare worse than their rational coun-
112 L. Germain, F. Rousseau, A. Vanhems
4. See Hilton (2007).
5. A detailed methodology used to compute the index can be found at
www.ubs.com/investoroptimism. The monthly level of the index is also given from its
launch date up to now. Other financial institutions also try to assess the market parti-
cipants’ sentiment. For that reason, in September 2006, a survey denominated “Fund
Manager Survey” was conducted on behalf of Merrill Lynch.
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terpart [see Odean (1998b), Gervais and Odean (2001), Caballé and
Sàkovics (2003), Biais et al. (2005) among others]. However, Kyle and
Wang (1997) and Benos (1998) find that moderately overconfident tra-
ders may earn larger expected profit than rational ones. Moreover, a
common finding to all these papers except Caballé and Sàkovics
(2003) is that trading volume, and price volatility increase with the
level of overconfidence. All these papers differ from ours as none of
them consider the possibility of irrational price setters. Odean (1998b)
is the only other paper considering irrational liquidity suppliers, this is
done in a Grossman-Stiglitz setting whereas we consider strategic mar-
ket making. Irrational risk averse liquidity suppliers buy costly infor-
mation and overestimate the precision of that information. These over-
confident traders are found to fare worse that uninformed traders.
Market depth is shown to increase with the level of overconfidence.
The misperception of the mean of prior information extends both Kyle
and Wang (1997) and Odean (1998b) and enables us to have a more
complete parameterization of irrationality. Therefore, the presence of
irrational market makers combined with the misperception in mean
and variance of prior information in an oligopoly framework constitute
one contribution of our paper.
III. MODEL
We study a financial market where a market maker and several tra-
ders exchange a risky asset whose future value v˜ follows a Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2v . Traders can be either
informed or uninformed (noise traders). Uninformed traders submit a
market order that is the realization of a normally distributed random
variable u˜ with zero mean and variance σ 2u . Informed traders are risk
neutral and can be one of two types: rational or irrational. N traders are
rational whereas M are irrational. Both types of traders have access to
private information, i.e. they observe a noisy signal of the future value
of the risky asset
s˜k = v˜ + ε˜k, with ε˜k ∼ N
(
0,σ 2ε
)
∀k = 1,...,N + M and v˜ ∼ N (0,σ 2v ) .
Irrational Market Makers 113
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These two types of traders differ in the beliefs they hold about both
the distribution of the risky asset value (prior information) and the
noise in the signal received.
As introduced in the previous sections, the irrational traders may
display several psychological traits: an optimism/pessimism bias and
an overconfident/underconfident bias. We define an optimistic (pessi-
mistic) trader as a trader who has an erroneous belief about the mean
of prior information with v˜ ∼ N (a,σ 2v ) . An optimistic (pessimistic)
trader mistakenly believes that the mean has a value of a > 0 (< 0).
The next psychological trait concerns the beliefs of the variances of
both prior information and signal noise. In our work, an irrational tra-
der j behaves as if his signal s˜j were drawn according to the following
noise distribution ε˜j ∼ N
(
0, 1
κ
σ 2ε
)
. The parameter 1
κ
denotes the level
of confidence. The case κ > 1 (respectively κ < 1) represents the case
of an overconfident (respectively underconfident) trader.6 To simplify
the notations, all irrational traders participating in the market are of the
same type, i.e. they misperceive the mean and the variance in the same
way. We present in the Appendix a generalization with different types
of irrational traders, including the case where some irrational traders
are optimist only and others are overconfident/underconfident only.
The results confirm the ones obtained with only one type of irrational
traders. Notice also that irrational traders rationally anticipates the
behavior of both the market maker and the remaining informed traders.
The main contribution of the paper is to consider that market
makers are also irrational. Our paper provides an understanding of the
effect of irrational market makers on the market. We assume that all
market makers have homogeneous irrational beliefs, contrary to the
114 L. Germain, F. Rousseau, A. Vanhems
6. Note that the parameter κ takes into account both the overconfident/underconfi-
dent bias and the “better (worse)-than average” bias. Indeed, when deriving the equi-
librium with two parameters κ1 and κ2 for the variances of the prior information and
the noise respectively, it appears that only the ratio κ1
κ2
matters and so both effects vary
jointly (see the detail of proof in Appendix under Comments on a Different
Parameterization of the Model after the proof of Proposition 1). The results are then
identical whether we choose one parameterization or the other. However the results are
easier to present with only one parameter incorporating the misperception of all
variances. Note that we have symetrically defined the behavior of both the market
makers and the traders. In particular both of them misperceive prior information.
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traders, and behave competitively.7 Therefore, we can aggregate the
behavior of the market makers and treat them as one player in the
game. We assume that each market maker has no access to any private
signal and that she misperceives the expectation and variance of the
distribution of prior information. Each market maker believes that the
distribution of the asset is such that
v˜ → N (a¯,κ¯σ 2v ) .
We interpret the parameter κ¯ as the \textquotedblleft variance opti-
mistic/pessimistic “effect or the “overconfidence/underconfidence”
effect: “variance optimistic” market maker for κ¯ < 1 and “variance
pessimistic” market maker for κ¯ > 1. At last, an optimistic market
maker believes that a¯ > 0.
The trading protocol is identical to Kyle (1985). The strategy of
each rational trader i is a Lebesgue measurable function, Xri : ℜ→ ℜ ,
such that x˜ri = Xri (s˜i ) for i = 1,...,N.8 The strategy of each irrational
trader j is identically defined: X irj : ℜ→ ℜ such that x˜ irj = X irj
(
s˜j
)
for j = 1,...,M . Finally, the market maker is risk neutral and behaves
competitively. She observes the aggregate order flow
y˜ =
N∑
i=1
x˜ri +
M∑
j=1
x˜ irj + u˜ before setting the price p˜. Let P : ℜ→ ℜ
denote a measurable function such that p˜ = P (y˜).
We now give the definition of an equilibrium for our model.
DEFINITION.
(
Xr1,...,X
r
N ,X
ir
1 ,...,X
ir
M ,P
)
is an equilibrium if the
price set by the market marker is such that
p˜ = E [ v˜| y˜] ,
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7. Considering a model where market makers have different parameters defining
their irrationality possibly including that some market makers are rational is left for
further research. Indeed, in this case the model would require market makers to behave
strategically. Each of them would set a price taking into account the type of other mar-
ker makers and so on. This type of framework where traders can split orders with dif-
ferent markers has been studied by Bernhardt and Hughson (1997).
8. See Stokey and Lucas (2001) for a definition of measurable functions.
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where E denotes the fact the market maker’s expectation is com-
puted given her erroneous beliefs and, given that price, the market
orders maximize the traders’ expected profit conditional on the
information received
Xri ∈ arg max
xri ∈ℜ
E
[
(v˜ − P (y˜)) xri
∣∣ s = si] ∀i = 1,...,N ,
X irj ∈ arg max
x irj ∈ℜ
E ir
[
(v˜ − P (y˜)) x irj
∣∣∣ s = sj]
∀ j = N + 1,...,N + M,
where E ir denotes the fact that the expectation for the irrational
trader is computed given his erroneous beliefs.
All agents know the number of rational and irrational traders as
well as the type of the irrational traders. Traders behave strategically
meaning that they take into account the impact of their orders on the
price.
IV. THE EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we solve for the general case where two types of
investors (irrational and rational) and irrational market makers partici-
pate in the market. After presenting the general proposition, we ana-
lyze two special cases of that proposition: the case where all market
participants are rational and the case where only some traders are irra-
tional but not the market makers. This presentation will help us
understand the effect of irrational traders and irrational market makers.
We now give the proposition establishing the form of the linear
equilibrium.
Let us define τ as the noise-to-signal ratio i.e. τ = σ 2ε
σ 2v
.
PROPOSITION 1.  There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only
if the following condition is satisfied
Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 [κ (κ − τ)+ 2τκ] + N (κ + 2τ)2
[(2τ + 1) κ − τ ] > 0. (1)  
116 L. Germain, F. Rousseau, A. Vanhems
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The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = αr∗ + βr∗si , ∀i = 1,...,N ,
x irj = αir∗ + β ir∗sj , ∀ j = 1,...,M,
p = µ∗ + λ∗y = µ∗ + λ∗
( N∑
i=1
xri +
M∑
j=1
x irj + u
)
,
where the coefficients are given in the appendix. The parameters
β∗’s represent the traders’ responsiveness to private information
whereas the α∗’s represent the part of their order not based on pri-
vate information. The parameter λ∗ represents the inverse of liqui-
dity and µ∗ the part of the price not depending on y. 
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
Impact of market maker’s over/under-confidence.
We first comment on condition (1). This condition identifies the situa-
tion where both the liquidity for the market and the quantity submitted by
traders are finite. From the expression, one can see that a variance opti-
mistic market maker exacerbates the occurrence of the non-existence of
an equilibrium whereas a pessimistic one alleviates it. This can be explai-
ned as follows. A variance optimistic market maker thinks that prior
information is more precise than it is and therefore believes that private
information is less substantial than it actually is. As a consequence, she
adjusts her price less aggressively and increases market depth, i.e. decrea-
ses λ∗. As a consequence, informed traders whether rational or irrational
respond by trading more intensely, implying that the non-existence of
equilibrium is more likely to occur. In other words a variance optimistic
market maker leads to too much trading as it is sets a high level of mar-
ket depth leading to traders to trade more as their orders have less impact
on the price. The exact opposite effects take place for a variance pessi-
mistic market maker and therefore explains the fact that the non-existence
of equilibrium is less likely to occur in that case. However, an equilibrium
may not exist with variance pessimistic market makers if the overconfi-
dent traders are too overconfident. Note that this condition does not
depend on the optimism parameters of the market makers or the traders.9
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We now provide a more detailed analysis of the existence condition.
It is useful to look at condition (1) as providing a lower bound for κ¯ in
order to have an equilibrium. In that case the condition can be rewrit-
ten as
κ >
(
Mκ2 (1 + 2τ)2 + N (κ + 2τ)2) τ
(1 + 2τ) (κ + 2τ) (Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 + N (κ + 2τ)2 τ) .
A market breakdown can occur with only one type of traders pre-
sent in the market provided that the market makers misperceive the
variance. Indeed when M = 0, κ¯ must be greater than τ2τ+1 to obtain
an equilibrium whereas when N = 0, we need κ¯ > τκ2τ+κ . Figure 1,
below, presents the equilibrium existence condition for three different
cases i.e. when N = 0, when M = 0 and when both M and N are
strictly positive. The existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed when κ¯
is above the curve corresponding to the particular situation. When both
types of traders participate in the market, whether the existence condi-
tion is more restrictive or not than with only one type of traders
depends on the level of overconfidence/underconfidence of the irratio-
nal traders and on how rational traders react to the presence of irratio-
nal traders. When irrational traders are overconfident (κ > 1), rational
traders reduce their trading intensity to limit the impact of their order
on the price as overconfident traders trade “too much”. This leads ove-
rall to a less restrictive existence condition. However, when irrational
traders have a large level of underconfidence, rational traders react by
increasing their trading intensity leading to a more restrictive existen-
ce condition. For a lower level of underconfidence, the existence
condition can be more restrictive with the two types of traders or less
restrictive than if one type of trader participates in the market.
118 L. Germain, F. Rousseau, A. Vanhems
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Impact of market maker’s optimism/pessimism
We now turn to the effect of the market maker’s mean mispercep-
tion onto the level of price. On the one hand, an optimistic (pessimis-
tic) market maker increases (decreases) the overall level of price
(through µ∗) as she wrongly believes that the expectation of the risky
asset is higher (lower) than it actually is. On the other hand, she also
corrects for the inflated or decreased order flow due to the mispercep-
tion of the mean, a, by irrational traders. The presence of optimistic
(pessimistic) traders induces an inflated (smaller) order flow which is
corrected by the market maker by setting a negative (positive) intercept
exactly equal to that inflated (smaller) order flow. The combination of
the two effects determines the size and the sign of the intercept of the
price function. When the market maker and the irrational traders hold
opposite beliefs about the mean of prior information, the effect on the
intercept is unambiguous.
The following Corollary establishes the form of the equilibrium for
the case where all market participants are rational (Benchmark 1) and
for the case where some traders are irrational whereas the market
makers are rational (Benchmark 2).
Irrational Market Makers 119
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Figure 1. – Lower bound for  κ¯ defined by the existence condition as
a function of κ. The graph is done for σ 2v = σ 2u = 1 and σ 2ε = 0.5.
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COROLLARY 1.
Benchmark 1: “All Rational Case” The linear equilibrium has the
following form
xi = βsi , with i = 1,...,M + N , with β =
σu
σv
√
(M + N ) (1 + τ),
p = λy, withy =
M+N∑
i=1
xi + u, with λ =
σv
√
(M + N ) (τ + 1)
[M + N + 1 + 2τ ] σu
.
Benchmark 2: There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only
if the following condition is satisfied
Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 [κ (1 − τ)+ 2τ ] + N (κ + 2τ)2 (1 + τ) > 0. (2)
The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = βˆr si , ∀i = 1,...,N ,
x irj = αˆir + βˆ ir sj , ∀ j = 1,...,M,
p = µˆ+ λˆ = µˆ+ λˆ
( N∑
i=1
xri +
M∑
j=1
x irj + u
)
,
where the coefficients are given in the appendix.
Proof. The first benchmark is proved by setting in Proposition 1
κ = 1, a = 0, κ¯ = 1 and a¯ = 0.
The second benchmark is proved by setting in Proposition 1 κ¯ = 1
and a¯ = 0 while letting κ 6= 1, and a 6= 0. ¤
The first benchmark corresponds to the case analyzed by Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988) whereas the second one is qualitatively identical
to Kyle and Wang (1997). As in Proposition 1, due to the presence of
optimistic/pessimistic traders, the price function has a non-zero inter-
cept, µˆ, as αˆir 6= 0. The market maker correctly anticipates that part
of the order flow and the rational traders do not react to the irrational
traders misperception of the mean i.e. αˆr = 0.
The equilibrium may not exist in Benchmark 2 whereas it always
exists in Benchmark 1. Comparing the two benchmarks we can see that
120 L. Germain, F. Rousseau, A. Vanhems
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this happens due to the presence of overconfident traders. More preci-
sely this depends on the level of their overconfidence and on their
number. We obtain that the equilibrium fails to exist when irrational
traders are too overconfident (κ > 2τ
τ−1) and when irrational traders are
too numerous leading to “too much” trading.
We now compare the trading intensities, i.e. the reaction to private
information β , of the informed market participants for the two bench-
marks and the general case under study. Different effects are at work
independently of the case. When only rational traders are present, a
noisier information leads those traders to trade less intensely on their
private information. When irrational traders are present, the previous
effect is also at work for both irrational and rational traders. However,
more noise implies that the more overconfident are irrational traders
the more they trade on their private information. As explained before,
rational traders respond to the presence of irrational traders. For very
underconfident (overconfident) traders, rational traders react less
(more) the noisier the private information. For intermediate values of
confidence the effect is ambiguous. These effects are also affected by
the number of traders but overall remain true for any numbers of ratio-
nal and irrational traders. A variance optimistic (pessimistic) market
maker amplifies (reduces) the previous effects. In Figure 2 and
Figure 3, we draw the trading intensities, i.e. the responsiveness to pri-
vate information as defined by the parameter β , as a function of κ
where the total number of traders is 20 from which 10 are rational. This
is done for both types of traders rational and irrational. The values of a
and a¯ do not affect trading intensities and we do not need to set them
to any particular values.
We now compare the liquidity parmeter, λ , across the different
models. This is done in Figures 4 and 5. When both types of traders
are present, overall, traders trade more on their private information lea-
ding to more liquidity with rational market makers and variance opti-
mistic ones. In that case and as explained before variance optimistic
market makers provide more liquidity than rational ones. Variance pes-
simistic market makers lead to less trading on private information
which in turn leads to less liquidity in the market. As can be seen in the
second graph however when irrational traders become more overconfi-
dent they increase their trading intensity which can lead to more liqui-
dity than in the “all rational case”. In Figures 4 and 5, the number of
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0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Irrational traders’ trading 
intensity (M = 10, N = 10 and 
Rational Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 10, N = 10 and Rational Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 0, N = 20 and Rational 
Market Makers)
Irrational traders’
trading intensity (M = 
10, N = 10 and 
irrational Market 
Makers)
Rational traders’
trading intensity (M = 
10, N = 10 and 
irrational Market 
Makers)
β
Figure 2. – Trading Intensities, β’s, for both types of traders as a
function of κ. When the market marker is assumed irrational, her irra-
tionality is κ¯ = 0.5. The graph is done for σ 2v = σ 2u = 1, σ 2ε = 5
and M + N = 20. 
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Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 0, N = 20 and Rational 
Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity 
(M = 10, N = 10 and irrational 
Market Makers)
Irrational traders’
trading intensity (M = 
10, N = 10 and 
irrational Market 
Makers)
Irrational traders’ trading 
intensity (M = 10, N = 10 and 
Rational Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 10, N = 10 and Rational Market Makers)
β
Figure 3. – Trading Intensities, β’s, for both types of traders as a
function of κ. When the market marker is assumed irrational, her irra-
tionality is κ¯ = 2. The graph is done for σ 2v = σ 2u = 1,
σ 2ε = 5 and M + N = 20. 
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λ
Figure 4. – Inverse of Liquidity, λ , as a function of κ. When the mar-
ket marker is assumed irrational, her irrationality κ¯ = 0.5. The graph
is done for σ 2v = σ 2u = 1, σ 2ε = 5 and M + N = 20.
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Figure 5. – Inverse of Liquidity, λ , as a function of κ. When the 
market marker is assumed irrational, her irrationality κ¯ = 2. The
graph is done for σ 2v = σ 2u = 1, σ 2ε = 5 and M + N = 20.
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traders is fixed equal to 20. When the two types of traders are present
10 are irrational traders whereas 10 are rational traders. The values of
a and a¯ do not affect trading intensities and we do not need to set them
to any particular values.
A question of interest is whether irrational traders can outperform
rational traders. It should be pointed out that condition (3) is derived
under the existence condition for the equilibrium. This is answered in
the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2.  The expected profits for the rational traders and
irrational traders are given, respectively, by
E
[
5r∗
] = (κ + 2τ)2
λ∗d2
[
σ 2v (τ + 1)+ a¯2 (2τ + 1)2
]
,
E
[
5ir∗
] = (2τ + 1)2
λ∗d2
[
σ 2v κ (κ (1 − τ)+ 2τ)
−a¯ (κ + 2τ)× (2τa − (κ + 2τ) a¯)] ,
where d = (2τ + N + 1) (κ + 2τ)+ Mκ (2τ + 1) and λ∗ is given
in the Appendix of Proposition 1.
An irrational trader outperforms a rational trader if and only if  
σ 2v (κ − 1)
(
κ
(
1 − 2τ 2)+ 2τ (1 + τ)) > a¯a (κ + 2τ) (2τ + 1)2 .
(3)
In particular, whenever the irrational traders and the market
makers hold sufficiently different opposite beliefs about the mean of
prior information (either a > 0 and a¯ < 0 or a < 0 and a¯ > 0)
irrational traders can outperform rational traders. Note that this is
also true for underconfident traders.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
The expected profits are computed under the true distributions of v˜
and ε˜. The level of optimism or pessimism, a, does not impact the
expected profit. This is due to two reasons. The first one being that a
is independent of any relevant information for the market maker. The
second one comes from the fact that the market maker perfectly eva-
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luates the part of the order flow coming from the misperception of the
mean and therefore rightly correct for it when setting the price. From
the expressions of the expected profits, one can see that following
intuition rational traders always obtain positive expected profits.
Irrational traders may obtain positive or negative expected profits. This
depends on their level of confidence, on the noise-to-signal ratio and
on whether and to what extent the traders’ beliefs about the mean are
different to the market makers’.
Condition (3) is necessary and sufficient for the irrational traders to
outperform the rational traders. This condition can hold only if the
equilibrium exists, that is if condition (1) holds true. Under the equili-
brium either irrational traders can outperform in expected terms the
rational traders or the opposite. It should be pointed out that it does not
depend on the number of rational traders M and the number of irratio-
nal traders N . This is due to the fact that M and N affect the expected
profit of both the irrational and rational traders in exactly the same
way, and when comparing expected profits their effect cancel each
other. It is also independent of κ¯. Indeed κ¯ affects the market depth
only and the rational and irrational traders react in exactly the same
way to an increase or decrease of market depth due to κ¯. Given that the
market marker is also irrational, this condition depends on both the
market maker’s and the irrational trader’s misperception of the mean,
and on the irrational trader’s beliefs about the variances.
As in the second benchmark case, an irrational trader can outper-
form a rational trader if his irrationality can act like a commitment
device to trade large quantity. However, in the general case two com-
ponents αir∗ and β ir∗ are available to the irrational trader for this com-
mitment device. Given the market maker’s mean misperception, αir∗ is
now a key element to analyze this commitment device. Beliefs about
the mean from both the irrational traders and the market maker affect
the coefficient αir∗. Contrary beliefs, if sufficiently different, lead the
irrational trader to buy when prices are too low on average or sell when
prices are too high on average. For instance, if market makers are pes-
simistic ( a¯ < 0), they decrease the overall level of price and if traders
are optimistic (a > 0), they want to buy the asset. Having this combi-
nation of beliefs and sufficiently different beliefs implies that traders
buy when prices are too low. This obviously increases the overall irra-
tional traders’ aggressiveness. As a consequence, compared to the
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second benchmark, traders with a higher level of overconfidence can out-
perform rational traders. Moreover, underconfident traders who trade
less aggressively on their private information (β ir∗ < βr∗) than their
rational counterpart can fare better than rational traders. Finally that
condition states that an irrational trader who is neither overconfident nor
underconfident (κ = 1) but misperceives the mean only can outperform
a rational trader as long as the mean misperception of that trader and of
the market marker are opposite. In that case, we have β ir∗ = βr∗, and
αir∗ is used as the commitment device as 
∣∣αir∗∣∣ > |αr∗| .
We now look at the expected profit of the market maker. Market
makers are competitive but irrational, therefore they compute the price
such that E [y (p − v) |y ] = 0 leading to p = E (v |y ). As they do not
use the right beliefs as in Kyle (1985), we show that their profits can be
positive or negative.
LEMMA 1 (Market maker’s expected profit).
The expected profit of the market maker is given by:
E
[
5M M∗
] = (2τ + 1) (κ + 2τ)
λ∗d2[
σ 2v (κ − 1) (Mκ (2τ + 1)+ N (κ + 2τ))
+a¯ (2τ + 1) (2Mτa − a¯ (κ + 2τ) (M + N ))] ,
where d = (2τ + N + 1) (κ + 2τ)+ Mκ (2τ + 1) and λ∗ is given
in the Appendix of Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
The following table summarizes, when clear, how an irrational mar-
ket maker performs overall.
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E
[
5M M∗
]
κ¯ < 1 κ¯ > 1
a¯ > 0 a¯ = 0 a¯ < 0 a¯ > 0 a¯ = 0 a¯ < 0
a > 0 > 0 or < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 > 0 or < 0
a = 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 > 0 or < 0
a < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 > 0 or < 0
Table 1. – Irrational Market Maker’s Expected Profit (E [5M M∗])
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The market maker, when rational (κ¯ = 1, a¯ = 0), obtains zero
expected profit. However, when she is irrational, she may obtain an
expected profit different from zero.
• The parameter κ¯ affects the level of liquidity. An increase in κ¯
increases λ . This reduces the informed traders’ sensitivity to their
private information. However, as noise trading is price inelastic
and other things being equal, the market maker’s expected profit
increases when κ¯ increases. This alone explains the results obtai-
ned when a¯ is equal to zero independently of the value of a.
• Other things being equal, the misperception of the mean by mar-
ket makers has a negative effect on their expected profits. Indeed,
an increase in price will lead traders to sell more whereas a
decrease in price will lead them to buy more.
• Moreover, when the price increases (decreases) and if the irrational
traders are pessimistic (optimistic) they are even more incline to sell
(buy) leading to even more negative expected profits for the market
maker. If the price increases and the irrational traders are optimistic,
the market maker’s expected profit is either positive or negative depen-
ding on the magnitude of both misperceptions of the mean. This
explains why most of the cells when κ¯ < 1 have a determinate sign
and why when κ¯ > 1 most of the cells have an indeterminate sign. 
V. IMPACTS ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
We now turn to some important measures of market performance
such as price efficiency, ex-ante volatility and trading volume.
LEMMA 2  (Price Efficiency and Ex-ante Volatility).
• The ex-ante volatility is equal to
var ( p˜) = σ
2
v (N (κ+2τ)+Mκ(2τ+1))((κ+2τ)(N+κ(2τ+1))+Mκ(2τ+1))
((N+2τ+1)(κ+2τ)+Mκ(2τ+1))2
.
It increases with κ¯. The effect of κ is ambiguous.
• The price efficiency is given by
[var ( v˜| p˜)]−1 = (N+κ(2τ+1))(κ+2τ)+Mκ(2τ+1)
σ 2vκ(κ+2τ)(1+2τ)
.
It decreases with κ¯ and increases with κ.
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Proof. See appendix. ¤
As described before, an optimistic (pessimistic) market maker sets
prices less (more) aggressively by increasing (decreasing) liquidity,
traders respond to it by increasing (decreasing) their trading intensity.
For the ex-ante volatility, the effect on the market depth dominates the
effects on the trading intensity. Regarding now the price efficiency, on
the one hand an increase of κ¯ decreases the traders’ trading intensity
and on the other hand it increases volatility.
We now explore the effect of each of the parameters defining the
irrationality on the trading volume.
LEMMA 3 (Trading Volume).
Let us define z˜ =
N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ri ∣∣+ M∑j=1
∣∣∣x˜ irj ∣∣∣+ |u˜| . The trading volume is given
by
E
[
z˜
] = Nαr erf ( a(2τ+1)
σv
√
2(1+τ)
)
+ Mαir erf
(
2τa−a(κ+2τ)
κσv
√
2(1+τ)
)
+
√
2
π
{
σu + Nσr exp
(
−(a(2τ+1))
2
σ 2v2(1+τ)
)
+Mσir exp
(
−(2τa−a(κ+2τ))
2
2σ 2v (κ)2(1+τ)
)}
,
where erf (x) = 2
π
∫ x
0 exp
(−t2) dt, σr = σ 2v (βr )2 (1 + τ) and
σir = σ 2v
(
β ir
)2
(1 + τ) .
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
It is a well documented fact that overconfidence leads to greater
volume traded [see Odean (1998b), Gervais and Odean (2001), Kyle
and Wang (1997) and Benos (1998) among others]. We also find that
result if we limit ourselves to the case of overconfident traders with a
rational market maker and with irrational traders who do not misper-
ceive the mean (a = 0). This is shown in Figure 6 below.
In Figure 6, we can see that increasing the level of overconfidence
leads to two contradicting effects on the volume. Higher level of over-
confidence leads rational traders to decrease the quantity they trade as
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they try to reduce the overall effect of the volume on price. The quan-
tity traded by irrational traders increases with the level of overconfi-
dence. This leads to the total volume depicted in the graph above.
However, when either a¯ 6= 0, or a 6= 0 or κ¯ 6= 1, this result is dra-
matically changed. Our model predicts high level of volume traded for
extreme level of confidence (for the informed trader). We obtain that
the trading volume can be a non-monotonic function (U-shaped) of the
level of confidence. When a¯ 6= 0, traders increase their trading if the
price is lower on average, or trade on the misperception of the mean
(a 6= 0). The two parameters a¯ and a have the same effect on the tra-
ded volume. A larger mean misperception whether positive or negative
implies greater volume traded. If this increase is greater than the reduc-
tion in volume due to the fact that traders trade less intensely on pri-
vate information, we obtain the result highlighted in Figures 7 and 8
below.
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Figure 6. – Total volume (E [z˜]), rational traders volume
(E
( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ri ∣∣)) and irrational traders volume (E ( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ iri ∣∣)) as a
function of the level of overconfidence when the market maker is
rational ( a¯ = 0 and κ¯ = 1) and a = 0. The simulations are done with
σ 2v = σ 2ε = σ 2u = 1 and M = N = 10.
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Figure 7. – Total volume (E [z˜]) as a function of the level of overcon-
fidence when κ¯ = 1, a¯ = 1 and a = 0. The simulations are done
with σ 2v = σ 2ε = σ 2u = 1 and M = N = 10.
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Figure 8. – Rational traders volume (E
( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ri ∣∣) ) and irrational
traders volume (E
( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ iri ∣∣)) as a function of the level of overconfi-
dence when κ¯ = 1, a¯ = 1 and a = 0. The simulations are done with
σ 2v = σ 2ε = σ 2u = 1 and M = N = 10.
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As explained before a lower κ¯ implies more trading. In Figure 9, we
show that if this over-trading is large enough it can result in large
volume traded by underconfident traders as well as rational traders.
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Figure 9. – Total volume (E [z˜]), rational traders volume
(E
( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ri ∣∣)) and irrational traders volume (E ( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ iri ∣∣)) as a
function of the level of overconfidence when κ¯ = 0.3 and a = a¯ = 0.
The simulations are done with σ 2v = σ 2ε = σ 2u = 1 and M = N = 10.
In Figure 10, we show the effect of the market maker’s mispercep-
tion of the mean on the volume traded by the different traders. The
effect of a¯ on the rational traders’ and irrational traders’ volume is
symmetric. Extreme beliefs imply larger volume being traded, though
the volume traded by irrational traders is also affected by their own
misperception of the mean.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first one to show that
excessive volume can be a result of underconfidence in the market, and
that irrationality in mean can impact the trading volume.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We develop a model of financial markets where irrational traders
along with rational traders trade a risky asset with an irrational market
maker. We model irrational traders as traders who, as well as misper-
ceiving the expected returns of the asset, misperceive the variance of
the volatility of the noise in the private signal. Those traders display
different psychological traits: a pessimistic/optimistic one (mispercep-
tion of the mean) and an underconfident/overconfident one (misper-
ception of the variance of the noise in the private information).
We compare our general model to two benchmarks: an “all ratio-
nal” case where all market participants are rational and the case where
only a subset of traders are irrational with rational market makers.
When comparing the two benchmarks we find that the presence of irra-
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Figure 10. – Total volume (E [z˜]), rational traders volume
(E
( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ri ∣∣)) and irrational traders volume (E ( N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜ iri ∣∣)) 
as a function of the market maker’s mean misperception when κ¯ = 1
and a = 5. The simulations are done with σ 2v = σ 2ε = σ 2u = 1and
M = N = 10.
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tional traders may lead to the non-existence of the equilibrium due to
\textquotedblleft too much\textquotedblright\ trading taking place. We
show that a variance optimistic market maker exacerbates the non-
existence of equilibrium whereas a variance pessimistic market maker
alleviates it. The introduction of an irrational market maker affects dif-
ferently the traders. Rational traders have larger expected profits when
the market maker is irrational. The impact on the irrational traders’
expected profit is not as clear. Irrational traders can have lower or grea-
ter expected profits due to the introduction of an irrational market
maker. We show that a moderately underconfident trader can outper-
form a rational trader and it is true for an optimistic or pessimistic tra-
der. The necessary condition to obtain that result is that the irrational
traders and the market maker must hold opposite beliefs about the
mean of prior information. This is a striking and new result. Moreover,
we also show that an irrational market maker can, in expected terms,
have positive profits. In addition, we show that the volume traded
might be non-monotonic function of the traders’ level of confidence.
Our model predicts high level of volume traded for extreme level of
confidence including the case where traders are underconfident. This
result raises the question whether the observed high volume is due to
overconfidence or to underconfidence. This could be tested empirically
as some indices such as the Index of Investor Optimism or the “Fund
Manager Survey” by Merrill Lynch measure the level of confidence in
the market. An experimental approach such as the one of Bloomfield
et al. (2000) could be also be used to test our model. Our model also
predicts high level of volatility.
An interesting extension of the model would be to look at how the
results obtained in the present model would be modified in a dynamic
setting by allowing traders to learn from the past. This is left for future
research. The model could also be extended by assuming that market
makers are heterogeneous with respect to their level of irrationality.
The price competition in that context could be analyzed. This exten-
sion is also left for future research.
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VII. APPENDIX
VII.1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Irrational Market Makers)
After maximizing the traders expected utility we get for the diffe-
rent parameters
αir∗ = 1
λ (M + 1)
[
a
τ
κ + τ
(
1 − λ (M − 1) β ir − λNβr)− µ− λNαr] ,
β ir∗ = κ (1 − λNβ
r)
λ ((M + 1) κ + 2τ) ,
αr∗ = − 1
λ (N + 1)
[
µ+ λMαir] ,
βr∗ = 1 − λMβ
ir
λ (N + 1 + 2τ) .
The market maker sets a price, p, such that
p = E¯ [ v˜| y] = E¯ [v˜]+ cov (v˜,y)
var (y)
(
y − E¯ (y)) , (4)
where the upper bar denotes that the expectation, covariance and
variance are computed given the wrong beliefs of the market maker.
Given the market maker’s additive misperception we obtain  
λ∗ =
(
Mβ ir + Nβr) κ(
Mβ ir + Nβr)2 κ + (Mβ ir 2 + Nβr 2) τ + σ 2u
σ 2v
, (5)
µ∗ = (1 − λMβ ir − λNβr) a − λMαir − λNαr . (6)
Solving the above system of six equations with six unknowns leads
if and only if Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 [κ (κ − τ)+ 2τκ] + N (κ + 2τ)2
((2τ + 1) κ − τ) > 0 for the irrational traders  
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αir∗ = (2τ+1)(2τa−a¯(κ+2τ))σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N (κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ) ,
β ir∗ = κ(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N (κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ) ,
for the rational traders
αr∗ = − a¯(κ+2τ)(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N (κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ) ,
βr∗ = (κ+2τ)σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N (κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ) ,
for the market maker
µ∗ = (2τ+1)[a¯(κ+2τ)(M+N+1)−2Mτa]Mκ(2τ+1)+(2τ+N+1)(κ+2τ) ,
λ∗ = σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N (κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ)
[Mκ(2τ+1)+N (κ+2τ)+(2τ+1)(κ+2τ)]σu .
Comments on a Different Parameterization of the Model.
An alternative model would have been to consider that irrational
traders behave as if their signals, s˜j = v˜ + ε˜j for j = 1,...,M , were
drawn according to the two following distributions
v˜ ∼ N (a,κ1σ 2v ) ,
ε˜j ∼ N
(
0,κ2σ 2ε
)
.
The market makers’ irrationality remains the same. In that case sol-
ving for the linear equilibrium by following the same steps as in
Proposition 1, would lead to the following result.
Result If and only if
Mκ1 (1 + 2τ)2 [κ1 (κ¯ − τ)+ 2κ2τ ]
+N (κ1 + 2κ2τ)2 [(2τ + 1) κ¯ − τ ] > 0,
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there exists a unique linear equilibrium. It is characterized by the fol-
lowing parameters
for the irrational traders
αˇir = (2τ+1)(2κ2τa−a¯(κ1+2κ2τ))σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N (κ1+2κ2τ)2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
βˇ ir = κ1(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N (κ1+2κ2τ)2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
for the rational traders
αˇr = − a¯(κ1+2κ2τ)(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N (κ1+2κ2τ)2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
βˇr = (κ1+2κ2τ)σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N (κ1+2κ2τ)2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
for the market maker
µˇ = (2τ+1)[a¯(κ1+2κ2τ)(M+N+1)−2Mκ2τa]Mκ1(2τ+1)+N (κ1+2κ2τ)+(2τ+1)(κ1+2κ2τ) ,
λˇ = σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N (κ1+2κ2τ)2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
[Mκ1(2τ+1)+N (κ1+2κ2τ)+(2τ+1)(κ1+2κ2τ)]σu .
Comparing those results with the ones obtained in Proposition 1, it
can be seen that by setting κ = κ1
κ2
in the model developed in the paper
leads to the equilibrium described here.
Proof of Proposition 2 It is straightforward to show that the irra-
tional traders’ expected profit are equal to
E
[
5ir∗
] = (2τ+1)2
λ∗d2
[
σ 2v κ (κ (1 − τ)+ 2τ)
−a¯ (κ + 2τ)× (2τa − (κ + 2τ) a¯)] ,
(7)
for the rational traders
E
[
5r∗
] = (κ+2τ)2
λ∗d2
[
σ 2v (τ + 1)+ a¯2 (2τ + 1)2
]
, (8)
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where d = (2τ + N + 1) (κ + 2τ)+ Mκ (2τ + 1) and λ∗ is given in
the proof of Proposition 1.
Given the above expressions, finding the sign of E
(
5ir∗
)− E (5r∗)
is equivalent to finding the sign of
σ 2v (κ − 1)
(
κ
(
1 − 2τ 2)+ 2τ (1 + τ))− a¯a (κ + 2τ) (2τ + 1)2 .
The comparison of the expected profits is then straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 1:
The market maker’s expected profit are equal to 
E
[
5M M∗
] = −N E (5r)− M E (5ir)+ E (5Liq) .
It is straightforward to show that the expected profit of the liquidity
traders, E
(
5Liq
)
, are equal to −λ∗σ 2u . Plug the expressions found for
the two types of traders (7) and (8) and for the liquidity traders into the
expression above and after some manipulations, one can get
E
[
5M M
] = (2τ+1)(κ+2τ)
λ∗d2
[
σ 2v (κ − 1) (Mκ (2τ + 1)+ N (κ + 2τ))
+a¯ (2τ + 1) (2Mτa − a¯ (κ + 2τ) (M + N ))] ,
where d = (2τ + N + 1) (κ + 2τ)+ Mκ (2τ + 1) .
Proof of Lemma 2: Straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The volume is given by
y =
N∑
i=1
∣∣xr∗i ∣∣+ M∑
j=1
∣∣x ir∗j ∣∣+ |u| .
Given the form of both xr∗i and x ir∗j , we have that they both follow
a normal distribution such that
xri ∼ N
(
αr∗,σ 2v
(
βr∗
)2
(1 + τ)
)
= N (αr∗,σ 2∗r )
x irj ∼ N
(
αir∗,σ 2v
(
β ir∗
)2
(1 + τ)
)
= N (αir∗,σ 2∗ir ) .
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From Leone et al. (1961) we obtain
E
[∣∣xr∗i ∣∣] = σ ∗r √ 2π exp (− (αr∗)22σ 2∗r )+ αr∗ erf
(
αr∗√
2σ 2∗r
)
,
E
[∣∣∣x ir∗j ∣∣∣] = σ ∗ir√ 2π exp (−(αir∗)22σ 2∗ir
)
+ αir∗ erf
(
αir∗√
2σ 2∗ir
)
,
E [|u|] = σu
√
2
π
,
where the function erf (x) = 2
π
∫ x
0 e
−t2dt .
The expected volume or trading volume is then defined as
E
[
N∑
i=1
∣∣xr∗i ∣∣+ M∑
j=1
∣∣x ir∗j ∣∣+ |u|
]
= E [|u|] + N E [∣∣xr∗i ∣∣]+ M E [∣∣x ir∗j ∣∣] .
This leads to the expected volume equal to√
2
π
{
σu + Nσ ∗r exp
(
− (αr∗)22σ 2∗r
)
+ Mσ ∗ir exp
(
−(αir∗)
2
2σ 2∗ir
)}
+Nαr∗ er f
(
αr∗√
2σ 2∗r
)
+ Mαir∗ erf
(
αir∗√
2σ 2∗ir
)
.
Given the expressions of αr∗, αir∗, σ 2∗r , and σ 2∗ir we obtain for the
expected volume√
2
π
{
σu + Nσ ∗r exp
(
−(a(2τ+1))
2
2σ 2v (1+τ)
)
+ Mσ ∗ir exp
(
−(2τa−a(κ+2τ))
2
2σ 2v (κ)2(1+τ)
)}
+Nαr∗ erf
(
a(2τ+1)
σv
√
2(1+τ)
)
+ Mαir∗ erf
(
2τa−a(κ+2τ)
κσv
√
2(1+τ)
)
.
VII.2. Extension: Two types of Irrational Traders
In this subsection we only change the assumption concerning the
homogeneity of irrational traders. We now assume that there are two
groups of irrational traders: among the M irrational traders M1 traders
are of type 1 and M2 traders are of type 2. A type 1 irrational trader
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behaves as if his signal, s˜1j = v˜ + ε˜j for j = 1,...,M1 , were drawn
according to the two following distributions
v˜ ∼ N (a1,σ 2v ) ,
ε˜j ∼ N
(
0,
1
κ1
σ 2ε
)
.
A type 2 irrational trader behaves as if his signal, s˜2j = v˜ + ε˜j for
j = 1,...,M2 , were drawn according to the two following distributions  
v˜ ∼ N (a2,σ 2v ) ,
ε˜j ∼ N
(
0,
1
κ2
σ 2ε
)
.
The N remaining traders are assumed to be rational and are defined
as before. The market makers are irrational.
Given the two types of irrational trader, the market maker observes
the following aggregate order flow y˜ =
N∑
i=1
x˜i +
M1∑
j=1
x˜ ir1j +
M2∑
j=1
x˜ ir2j + u˜ .
The following proposition shows the form of the equilibrium for
this new setting.
PROPOSITION 3.  There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only
if the following condition is satisfied
M1κ1 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ1 (κ − τ)+ 2τκ)
+M2κ2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ1 + 2τ)2 (κ2 (κ − τ)+ 2τκ)
+N (κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ1 + 2τ)2 ((κ − τ)+ 2τκ) > 0.
The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = αr + βr si , ∀i = 1,...,N ,
x ir1j = αir1 + β ir1sj , ∀ j = 1,...,M1
x ir2j = αir2 + β ir2sj , ∀ j = 1,...,M2
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p = µ+ λy = µ+ λ
( N∑
i=1
xri +
M1∑
j=1
x ir1j +
M2∑
j=1
x ir2j + u
)
.
The expressions of the parameters are given in the appendix.
Proof.
After maximizing the traders ‘expected utility, as in the proof of
proposition 2, we get the following system of equations
αir1 = 1
λ(M1+1)
[
a1 τ
κ1+τ
(
1 − λ (M1 − 1) β ir1 − λNβr − λM2β ir2
)
−µ− λNαr − λM2αir2
]
,
β ir1 = κ
1(1−λNβr−λM2βir2)
λ((M1+1)κ1+2τ)
,
αir2 = 1
λ(M2+1)
[
a2 τ
κ2+τ
(
1 − λ (M2 − 1) β ir2 − λNβr − λM1β ir1
)
−µ− λNαr − λM1αir1
]
,
β ir2 = κ
2(1−λNβr−λM1βir1)
λ((M2+1)κ2+2τ)
,
αr = − 1
λ(N+1)
[
µ+ λM1αir1 + λM2αir2
]
,
βr = 1−λM1β
ir1−λM2βir2
λ(N+1+2τ)
The market maker sets a price, p, as in (4). This leads to the follo-
wing two extra equations
λ =
(
M1β ir1 + M2β ir2 + Nβr
)
κ
(M1β ir1 + M2β ir2 + Nβr)2 κ +
(
M1β ir12 + M2β ir22 + Nβr2
)
τ + σ2u
σ2v
,
µ = (1 − λM1β ir1 − λM2β ir2 − λNβr) a − λM1αir1 − λM2αir2 − λNαr .
Solving the above system of eight equations with eight unknowns
leads to the following result:
There exists an equilibrium iff the following condition is satisfied
M1κ1 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ1 (κ − τ)+ 2τκ)
+M2κ2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ1 + 2τ)2 (κ2 (κ − τ)+ 2τκ)
+N (κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ1 + 2τ)2 ((κ − τ)+ 2τκ) > 0.
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The equilibrium parameters are given by
β ir1 = κ
1 (1 + 2τ) (κ2 + 2τ)
λd
,
β ir2 = κ
2 (1 + 2τ) (κ1 + 2τ)
λd
,
βr =
(
κ1 + 2τ) (κ2 + 2τ)
λd
,
αir1 = (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ) (2a1τ − a (κ1 + 2τ))
λd
,
αir2 = (1 + 2τ)
(
κ1 + 2τ) (2a2τ − a (κ2 + 2τ))
λd
,
αr = −a (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ) (κ1 + 2τ)
λd
,
λ = σv
σud
[
M1κ1 (1 + 2τ )2
(
κ2 + 2τ )2 (κ1 (κ − τ )+ 2τκ)
+M2κ2 (1 + 2τ )2
(
κ1 + 2τ )2 (κ2 (κ − τ )+ 2τκ)
+N (κ2 + 2τ )2 (κ1 + 2τ )2 ((κ − τ )+ 2τκ)] 12 ,
µ = (1+2τ)(a(1+M1+M2+N)(κ2+2τ)(κ1+2τ)−2τ(a2 M2(κ1+2τ)+a1 M1(κ2+2τ)))d ,
where
d = (κ1 + 2τ) (κ2 + 2τ) (1 + N + 2τ)+ Nκ1κ2
+ (1 + 2τ) (2τ (κ1 M1 + κ2 M2)+ κ1κ2 (1 + M1 + M2)) .
¤
The form of the equilibrium is similar to the equilibrium found in
proposition 1 with the presence of two types of irrational traders. The
equilibrium condition can be interpreted in the same way as before that
is when traders want to trade unbounded quantity and the market want
to supply infinite liquidity the equilibrium fails to exist.
We do not show the condition for which irrational traders can fare
better than rational traders as the condition is more cumbersome than
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before. However, the intuition of the condition is the same as for the
previous case.10
A particular case of interest would be to consider the case where
one group is optimist (type 1) whereas the other one is overconfi-
dent/underconfident (type 2). The following lemma gives the form of
the equilibrium.
LEMMA A1: There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only if
the following condition is satisfied
(M1 + N )
(
κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ (1 + 2τ)− τ)
+M2κ2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 (κ − τ)+ 2τκ) > 0.
The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = αr + βr si , ∀i = 1,...,N ,
x ir1j = αir1 + β ir1sj , ∀ j = 1,...,M1
x ir2j = αir2 + β ir2sj , ∀ j = 1,...,M2
p = µ+ λy = µ+ λ
( N∑
i=1
xri +
M1∑
j=1
x ir1j +
M2∑
j=1
x ir2j + u
)
.
The expressions of the parameters are given by
β ir1 = βr = (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ)
λd1
,
β ir2 = κ
2 (1 + 2τ) (κ1 + 2τ)
λd1
,
αir1 = (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ) (2a1τ − a (1 + 2τ))
λd1
,
αir2 = αr = −a (1 + 2τ)
2 (κ2 + 2τ)
λd1
,
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λ = σv (1 + 2τ)
σud1
[
(M1 + N )
(
κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ − τ + 2τκ)
+M2κ2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 (κ − τ)+ 2τκ)]12 ,
µ = (1+2τ)(a(1+M1+M2+N )(κ2+2τ)(1+2τ)−2τa1 M1(κ2+2τ))d1 ,
where
d1 = (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ) (1 + N + 2τ)+ Nκ2
+ (1 + 2τ) (2τ (M1 + κ2 M2)+ κ2 (1 + M1 + M2)) .
Proof. This Lemma is proved by setting κ1 = 1 and a2 = 0 in the
proof of the previous Proposition. ¤
As before the intuition of that configuration is the same as the pre-
vious one.
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